Why is it so hard to discuss what is fair?

A short post today (casual 4am blog posts), one can think of this as part 1.5 of the theory of discrimination. I want to talk about why effective discussion on topics of fairness are so difficult.

In philosophical discussions, there is often a plea towards some initial intuitions. We often think that our intuitions are our stable position. If someone proposes a theory that seems to fail to accord with such intuitions then this theory must be seriously convincing in order to overturn another theory that seems to work with such intuitions. It might be argued that many of our intuitions are actually fundamentally wrong. For example it is commonly thought that raising children is a good thing, but there are some strong arguments to suggest that this simple act is morally wrong. Regardless, for now let us assume that when discuss a philosophical topic, in this case fairness there exists some reliance on intuitions.

Now, the problem here is that fairness is an unfortunately emotive topic that seems to be biased towards certain sides. I discussed earlier that whilst we wish to begin with a $\Delta_0$ (see below for notation explanation) where we treat everyone equally, we quickly move away from this simply because people seem to have different needs. Discussions of fairness, one might think, are really discussions of how we justifiably treat people differently. Fairness can be considered a distribution function $F$ over a finite number of agents $X = A_1, A_2 . . . A_n$. We wish to decide how we should distribute utility, or a specific resource to these different agents, knowing that they each have specific needs. Whilst on might want to do this mathematically, it might be thought that such mathematical calculations fail to really take into account the full picture of the person. It treats them too much as mundane silent and perfectly rational agents.

This leads to what we might think to be a philosophical discussion of $F$, yet also a discussion that it is difficult to engage in without bias. Here's a basic example: we have two agents $M, W$ and let us suppose that agent $W$ is pregnant, with $M$ being the other party (assume only two agents). Who ought to be able to decide whether the child will be born? A $\Delta_0$ would mean that both parties have equal decision in this process, whilst we might consider a $\Delta_1$ where we justify agent $W$ as having greater right or say in the matter.

A difficulty lies here in that when we engage in such discussion of fairness for $M, W$ it is very difficult to approach such discussions without prior bias, largely because our reasoning relies on this notion of intuitions. A person might identify more with $W$, or more with $M$ and be unable to really think as objectively as we might wish them to do. We want to be charitable towards other views, to really take what they are saying into consideration and to take their argument in their strongest position. Yet, I would argue that even this is not enough. The opposing argument is still unfortunately tainted by some degree of bias, and thus it is still hard to really see the bigger picture. What we really have to do is to adopt some sort of principle of self negativity, where we have to really do what we can to criticise our own argument and to see as many sides as possible. This, it might be thought, is impossible. Can one really try their very best to find the flaws in their own work? Perhaps, but I am skeptical (some meta claims might be made here!).

The problem is really that when we approach a topic, we have our own specific biases and we choose our own specific side. Ideally when we engage with ideas, we are approaching each idea with the same base line. For a given person $K$, suppose we fix this baseline as $L$. Now suppose $K$ supports a specific side of a debate. We wish to have an effective discussion so we want $K$ to really be able to consider the other side of the argument, using the exact same base line $L$. Unfortunately, I claimed that this was not possible. The best approximation we might think is another agent presenting the other side of the argument. However this other agent has their own personal ideas and intuitions and possess a different base line. As a result, it is really difficult to approach what they are saying in such an objective and 'fair' manner.

Notational points: I plan to keep my notation relatively consistent, and ideally standard (but a lot of these ideas are my own). For reference, $\Delta_0$ refers to a 'initial position' where we treat everything with pure equality (equal distribution of everything). $\Delta_1 . . $ refers to modified versions of this position where we begin to use certain factors to justify differential treatment.

A theory of discrimination [1]

Discrimination is often associated with words such as sexism, racism which typically think to be quite negative. On a basic level, we might think of discrimination to be the differential treatment of an individual or group on the basis of some characteristic. Whilst many would take discrimination to only refer to negative treatment, I think this only leads to confusion. It might be thought that treatment is relative - if we provide preferential treatment to a given group (e.g. ethnic minorities) this indirectly counts as negative differential treatment to those who do not satisfy this group.

Now, perhaps the most interesting question is why we think discrimination to be bad. Or to to be more precise, why do we think that racism, or sexism or discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or class to be morally wrong. Our immediate intuition I think is based around some notion of equality. We think that it is morally wrong for someone to take into account someone elses gender or race when deciding how to treat them, on the basis of equality.

There are two main issues with this type of claim. The first is that it fails to capture the whole picture. We might think it is permissible to treat men and women differently in terms of having gender specific toilets or changing rooms. Or we might agree with the UK law that allows restaurant owners to make hiring decisions based on perceived race, in the case of themed restaurants. Whilst some might think that you should never take into account these characteristics, I think this is an extreme position.

The second issue is how we ought to think about equality. I think most would agree that equality defined on the basis of purely equal treatment is ineffective and perhaps even immoral. If I have $5$ pieces of medicine, $5$ ill people and $5$ healthy people it is stupid to think that on the basis of equality I ought to give each person half a piece, regardless of whether they need it or not. Instead, I think that we should only consider equal treatment as our 'initial equilibrium', call it $\Delta_0$. For someone to use a certain factor to discriminate against another, the onus is on them to provide justification of why such a factor is relevant. 

Consider the case of university that has to select which students to admit into their universities. We start at $\Delta_0$ where all students are admitted with the same chance, regardless of any characteristics. Now, we argue that academic achievement ought to be a relevant factor. That is, the university ought to be justified in using academic achievement as a means of discriminating between candidates. If we accept this claim, then we move on $\Delta_1$. We could in theory add new factors leaving us with a sequence of different states. The key importance is that one must justify why they are using such a factor. No factor is taken from granted.

This serves as a good point to conclude this post. This is intended to be part of a series of posts since this topic is quite complicated. In my next post I am going to discuss the type of justification required in order for us to justifiably discriminate.

Why the morality of abortion is non trivial

I am somewhat surprised that I have come to talk about this topic, but I feel like it needs to be discussed. Given how contentious the issue is, I am surprised to see so many people assume that it has a trivial answer. I've seen people group questions of abortions in the same category of questions of racism, or homophobia, when their fundamental basis is quite different. Perhaps a close link can be made with sexism, and I think there are certainly some interesting arguments in this area. Whether they are sufficient is another question, and I certainly don't think it is as obvious as people make it out to be.

Whilst this post is largely reactionary against 'pro-choice' supporters, I think I'm going to try and respond to both sides. The reason is that I think this issue is a lot more philosophically complex than people make it out to be, certainly not to the point that an answer could be thought obvious. Compared to an essay, in this blog I'm not really going to take a specific side, my aim is simply to show that these questions are hard and that we should be considerably more sceptical about how think about them. Note that I'm only going to discuss the morality of abortion, as opposed to whether it ought to be legal (I think it should be, but these questions are quite different).

First, let us consider the pro-choice side, which I take to be the prevailing consensus at the moment (and the main target of this post). Philosophically, I think the most interesting arguments are those that discuss the autonomy of the mother over own body. It is commonly argued that the mother has a right to her own body, and thus she can choose how she ought to use it. Whilst a certainly appealing rhetoric, this claim is not enough to justify their cause. Suppose that we think a foetus to be a person, that has a much value as you and I. Should a mothers right to her own body automatically override said child's right to life? Taking it another way, is it trivial to think that my right to own body is a significant enough moral factor to override another's right to life? There are certainly some sophisticated arguments supporting this, but I certainly don't think this is obvious. 

Due to this, a number of pro-choice arguments focus around stripping the foetus person-hood away from it. If the foetus lacks said person-hood, then it seems to lack this right to life and thus there does not seem to be anything morally troublesome about aborting it. Now this process is also quite difficult. Some poor arguments revolve around claims about the difficulties in 'drawing a line'. Whilst I certainly agree, this in itself is not enough to claim that no such line exists. Many would think it permissible to abort a 8-cell zygote, whilst few would think it permissible to abort an 8 month old foetus. A reasonable claim is to think the foetus becomes a person at the point it can feel pain. Whilst it is not obvious how this line is justified, we might think at least that a foetus aborted before this point will not suffer. One should still note that under this argument, it might be justified in aborting older foetuses as long as we used anaesthesia.

The strongest argument from the pro-life side seems to be this presumed right to life of the child. One might think that a person's right to life ought to have greater moral weight than a woman's right to her body, and hence abortion is simply a discussion of whether the foetus is a person. A fantastic paper from Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that even if a foetus is a person, in certain conditions the mother may still be permitted to have an adoption. Her central argument is based around an issue of consent from the mother. If the mother gave consent to the child to use her own body then it seems she has waived her own right to the body and thus it is impermissible for her to have an abortion. On the other hand, if the mother was forced into pregnancy (or took significant efforts against it but was very unlucky) then an abortion is allowed. In certain cases (for example in self defence) we are justly able to take the life of a person. The difficulty here is in showing that abortion is such a case.

Of course Thomson's claims are not without flaws, and one might make arguments towards a special relationship between a mother and her child. It might be argued that due to said relationship she has an obligation to protect the life of said child, even if she did not initially give consent to it. Still, the existence of arguments of this form is very significant as it further shows that the issue is non-trivial. Even when we grant the foetus the rights of a person, it still seems there are cases where abortion is morally permissible.

As I said, I'm not really trying to argue for one side or the other. I just want people to be a bit sceptical about these sort of things. Whilst I think it women do have a right to their own body, I don't think that this necessarily implies that an abortion is permissible. It is an important factor to be sure, but the question is much deeper than that. Please stop thinking that someone who is against abortion is simply against female autonomy. There are very valid reasons to be either.

Why atheists should be careful in their claims

More than ever, people seem to be embracing atheism and rejecting the notion of god. Whilst this pleases me on some level, I am worried that they are doing so for the wrong reasons. Whether or not god exists is a non trivial question, but many articles seem to make it out to be very basic. Such articles often like to describe different arguments in favour of god (e.g. First cause argument, ontological argument, design argument etc) and then dismiss them in just a few lines. I feel that this presents the case in a very biased way, and that those who reject the notion of god should perhaps be a bit more careful on deciding why exactly they do so.

The first thing to note is that the existence of god is a largely seperate issue from questions of whether religion is a good thing, whether religion has a positive or negative impact on our lives. Often people make claims of non existence on the basis that that the religions cause harm, which does not directly follow. We can plausibly imagine the existence of a god, yet hold that those who worship said god are destructive.

The second thing to note is that there are a number of possible 'methods' to in theory verify God. The first is a deductive argument, akin to Gödel's ontological argument that rely purely on logic. Whilst the logic is usually flawless, they rely on a number of premises that might be viewed as questionable, and are often rejected by atheists. The second type of argument is an inductive argument, focused around empirical data and an evidence based approach. I think this is the type of view that gathers more support, and pleads towards the scientific method. This argument (call it S) rejects God on the basis of insufficient evidence.

I've discussed previously why I am somewhat skeptical about the scientific method, but I do think it holds certain merits here. S seems to be based around an intuition regarding statistical hypotheses. We take the null hypothesis that God does not exist, and we keep this position until there is significant evidence to say that God does exist. In this sense, the onus lies upon the theist provide an explanation of God's existence. The atheist only needs to assess whether this evidence is significant, which they usually conclude to not be the case

What does this mean? Well an atheist under S lacks the argumentative resources to actually argue that God does not exist. They maintain a rejection of God by arguing that there is insufficient evidence to say that God does exist. Note that this is because we are engaging with a type of inductive argument and thus we are not able to (logically) deductively prove whether something is the case. We can only provide support for a given position by considering the evidence. 

This is a crucial difference. To argue that God does not exist places the onus on the existing party and thus an atheist who adopts such position must provide the evidence to show this non existence. To simply reject the null hypothesis is a much safer and easier position to hold. Thus, atheists can effectively respond to the question of 'why do you not believe in god' by 'why?'. Yet theists can also easily respond to the question of 'can't you see that god does not exist' by 'why?'. 

As an atheist myself, this is the position I hold. I have not received enough evidence to reject my null hypothesis that god does not exist. A final note that it is also non trivial as a question of why we ought to take this as a null hypothesis. Indeed there seem to be good arguments to suggest that we ought to actually assume the null hypothesis that God does exist and ask for evidence that it does not. Still, the intuition seems to be that since we can not perceive the existence of God, we ought to null assume non existence. I might discuss this concept in another blog post in the future.

Why we should be more skeptical

I personally adopt a variant of skeptical invariantism, where I think that the standards of knowledge are so high to the point of being near unattainable. In order for us to know that P we have to be able to eliminate all possibilities where P does not hold. Thus in order for us to know that we have hands, we must be able to eliminate cases where we are dreaming, or cases where we are being tricked by an evil demon. Nevertheless, I believe we can still use the notion of knowledge in ordinary contexts by validly asserting that we have knowledge even though we do not. In this sense, our usage of the knowledge term is more relaxed than the extreme standards I have set.

Still, I believe that even in terms of assertions, we should be much more careful than we currently are. It is promising to see around me that people are demanding some sort of reasoning before they are willing to accept new things. They have an initial level of skepticism, and they demand evidence before accepting claims. However I am worried that they approach such evidence with too much charity. 

We are taught about the scientific method, which focuses on evidence and critical analysis. How we should only accept things on the basis of evidence and justification. This, it is said grounds scientific discoveries. Whilst this is certainly true, I worry that people are buying into scientific positivism and are overestimating the degree of certainty in such knowledge assertions. Science is powerful, but it is still inductive reasoning. We consider the empirical data and we reason that a given theory provides and the most convincing explanation of the theory. These theories are peer reviewed by professional academics in the field who have spent decades studying them. Yet this does not mean that the theory is correct, or true.

We are often far too willing to take such scientific assertions as factual when they are not. We make claims that the theory of evolution is true or that global warming is real when we can not be certain of either. Now this is not to say that we are unjustified in supporting such theories; we have considerable reason to do so. I think people act in this way as a type of over-reaction to others who doubt sciences rigour yet seem willing to support baseless claims. To people who are scared of vaccines on the grounds of a questionable study, but are willing to embrace alternative medicines that may have no justification. I can see how It must be frustrating to deal with such cases of varying standards. I personally find it frustrating simply to see how low such standards are.

Admittedly, I would rather people blindly follow science than ignore it entirely. Yet, we can do much better with just a little bit more skepticism. Things are rarely as simple as they might seem, and the current explanation is not necessarily the best one. Perhaps depressingly, we ought to really consider why we actually believe in certain claims. Is it because we have seen the evidence ourselves, or are we blindly trusting the words of supposed experts, who we think to have knowledge?